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Prevention of bouncing attack on FFG
TL;DR We present a simple fix on FFG which makes it difficult for an attacker to continue bouncing attack unless the attacker has strong control over the network. Prerequisites: Analysis of bouncing...
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If you set k = \frac{1}{3} - \epsilon, then if fraction 2\epsilon of validators are offline and the attacker causes a fork right before k, then honest validators would not be able to cause...
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Prevention of bouncing attack on FFG
The fault tolerance for safety & liveness would be still 1/3. When an attacker published a new justified checkpoint in a conflicting chain in the first k slots, honest validators might not be able...
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Prevention of bouncing attack on FFG
nrryuya: if there are two honest validator sets both of whose sizes are less than 2/3 accepted conflicting latest justified checkpoints due to temporal asynchrony, doesn’t it take at least three...
View ArticlePrevention of bouncing attack on FFG
I agree that the “two validator sets accepted conflicting latest justified checkpoints” situation is rare but it is the situation which makes the unlocking rule necessary. The three epochs locking...
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Prevention of bouncing attack on FFG
I found a more complicated bouncing condition, which I didn’t cover in the previous analysis. Here, an attacker can start a bouncing attack against the above fix if k > 0. Setting k = 0 fixes this,...
View ArticlePrevention of bouncing attack on FFG
Could you please explain more specifically in which case it will happen? Will it happen under FMD? Thanks! Read full topic
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